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ARE SCHOOL 
SUPERINTENDENTS 
REWARDED FOR 
"PERFORMANCE"? 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
Richard P. Chaykowski 
Randy A. Ehrenberg 
The April 1983 report of the National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, A Nation at Risk, focused public attention on the need to 
reform public education. Among its most hotly debated proposals 
was one to institute merit pay plans for teachers, despite the fact 
that historically merit pay plans have not met with much success in 
public education, at least partially because certain characteristics of 
public education make their implementation problematic (see, for 
example, Bacharach, Lipsky, and Shedd 1984 and Murnane and 
Cohen 1986). 
Somewhat surprisingly, less attention has been directed to the role 
that educational administrators (school principals and superinten-
dents) play in the educational process and their methods of compen-
sation. Given their roles in a variety of areas, including the recruit-
ment and continual motivation of teachers, the design of curriculum, 
the setting of educational goals, and their management of school dis-
trict resources, one might expect administrators' actions to be of 
importance in determining both how much students learn and the 
We are grateful to the numerous school superintendents who responded to the survey 
used in this chapter, to the staff of the Cornell Institute of Social and Economic Research 
for acquiring a number of the data tapes that we used, to Eileen Driscoll for facilitating our 
use of these data, and most especially, to Jeffrey Keefe for his assistance coding and analyz-
ing data during the early stages of the project. We are also deeply indebted to numerous col-
leagues at Cornell, the NBER, and other institutions for their comments on earlier drafts. 
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cost of public education to taxpayers (see the "effective school" 
literature, in for example, Bossert, et al. 1982, Kroeze 1982, and 
Hallinger and Murphy 1982). Yet there has been little public call for 
formal merit pay plans for school administrators. This is puzzling 
because studies of individual (as opposed to group) merit or incentive 
pay plans in the for-profit sector of the economy find that they tend 
to be concentrated at upper levels of management, where fundamen-
tal policy and managerial decisions are made, rather than at levels 
covering all employees (see Milkovich and Newman 1984). 
In fact, although there is a voluminous literature on the determi-
nants of teachers' salaries (see Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1986 and Lip-
sky 1982), little is known about the forces influencing the compensa-
tion of school administrators. In particular, little evidence is avail-
able about whether school administrators explicitly or implicitly are 
rewarded for their school districts' performance by higher compensa-
tion and/or greater opportunities for mobility to higher-paying posi-
tions.1 Such evidence is clearly important for policy debate; unless 
there is evidence that school administrators' compensation is at least 
implicitly tied to their district's "performance," a case can be made 
that consideration should be given to building incentives for improv-
ing school district performance explicitly into their compensation 
arrangements. 
This chapter presents analyses of the compensation and mobility 
of school superintendents in New York State during the 1978-79 
to 1982-83 period. The focus is on school superintendents because 
they are the chief operating officers of school districts, their salaries 
are determined through individual "negotiations" with school boards, 
and their salary data were made available to us.2 In contrast, school 
principals' salary data were not available to us. Especially in large 
districts, principals tend to be members of a union and their salary 
increases negotiated collectively, which limits the likelihood of ob-
serving individual principals' salaries being related to measures of 
their school's performance. 
The discussion begins in the following section with a description 
of the characteristics of school superintendents in New York State, 
including their patterns of mobility and compensation. To provide 
information on the structure of school superintendents' compensa-
tion, multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the extent to 
which superintendents' salaries are related to characteristics of both 
their school districts and themselves. Estimates of the extent to 
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which superintendents' probabilities of mobility and salary changes 
are related to measures of their school districts' "performance" are 
then discussed. Finally, in the last two sections we discuss whether 
school superintendents appear to influence these school district "per-
formance" measures and the implications of our findings for public 
policy. 
A crucial element in the study is the definition of performance. 
Because school districts and their school board members are idiosyn-
cratic and evaluate superintendents' performance in a wide variety 
of ways, our methodology is to focus on a few well-defined out-
comes. Specifically, we assume that school districts value high edu-
cational performance and low school tax rates, each relative to the 
comparable outcome in "similar" school districts in the state.3 The 
discussion is nontechnical in nature; technical details, including 
underlying tables of statistical findings, can be found in other work 
of ours (Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1986, 1988). 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SCHOOL 
SUPERINTENDENTS IN NEW YORK STATE 
To obtain background data on the characteristics of school superin-
tendents in New York State, a survey was mailed to the approxi-
mately 700 school districts in the state (excluding New York City) 
in May 1985, and a follow-up survey sent to nonrespondents in July 
of that year. We received 496 responses; this represents almost a 70 
percent response rate. The sample appears to be representative of 
superintendents in the state; the response rate did not vary syste-
matically with either school district size or with whether the county 
in which the district was located was upstate or downstate. 
Table 12-1 presents some descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Respondents averaged nearly forty-nine years of age and first became 
superintendents at about the age of forty. The typical superinten-
dent had been at his or her job for six years and had close to three 
years' total tenure in previous superintendents' positions. About 50 
percent of the sample had received a certificate of advanced study in 
school administration, while close to 40 percent had received a doc-
torate degree. 
Table 12-2 tabulates the distribution of respondents by years on 
their current job. Superintendents in the sample spent between one 
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Table 12-1. Descriptive Statistics.3 
Variable 
AGE 
AGEF 
TEN 
NUM 
EXPS 
SIZE 
CDEG 
DDEG 
Sample 
Size 
466 
466 
495 
495 
495 
192 
490 
494 
Mean 
48.91 
40.02 
6.07 
0.60 
2.76 
0.43 
0.48 
0.38 
Standard 
Deviation 
7.05 
6.56 
5.04 
0.98 
4.40 
0.76 
0.50 
0.49 
Minimum 
33 
25 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Maximum 
69 
62 
28 
8 
23 
2 
1 
1 
a. Sample sizes are less than the overall sample of 496 due to nonreporting of data. 
AGE = age in years. 
AGEF = age when first became superintendent. 
TEN = number of years at current position. 
NUM = number of previous superintendent positions. 
EXPS = total years tenure at previous positions. 
SIZE = (for individuals who held a previous superintendent position) previous district 
was smaller (0), about the same size (1), or larger (2) than current district. 
CDEG = 1 = has a certificate of advanced study; 0 = no. 
DDEG = 1 = has a doctorate degree; 0 = no. 
and twenty-eight years in their current jobs and the longer the job 
tenure, the smaller the number of superintendents observed. Indeed, 
a simple semilog function fit the data very well and implies that the 
number of superintendents with any given level of tenure on the job 
is roughly 19 percent more than the number with one additional year 
of tenure. 
Finally, Table 12-3 presents data on the total number of super-
intendent positions held in each respondent's career, by age category 
of respondent. Although one hears much talk about how mobile 
superintendents are, the vast majority of superintendents in the sam-
ple had held (as of the survey date) less than four positions during 
their lifetimes (panel A). When they did change positions, they 
tended to move to larger districts; however, the probability that a 
job change led them to a smaller district increased as they aged 
(panel B). 
Our analyses of superintendents' compensation use data from the 
over 700 school districts in New York State during the 1978-79 to 
1982-83 period obtained from the New York State Education De-
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Table 12-2. Tenure on Current Job. 
Years Years 
Tenure Number Tenure Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
81 
64 
48 
54 
42 
33 
24 
27 
19 
15 
12 
14 
10 
6 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
12 
8 
8 
5 
5 
2 
0 
0 
1 
Note: Fitting a semilog function to the first twenty-five years observations yields 
log (number/) = 4.688 - .190 (years tenure/') R* = .946 
(.138) (.009) 
Table 12-3a. Number of Superintendent Positions Held, by Age.a 
Age Category 
Number of 
Positions All < 40 40-49 50-59 > 59 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Total 
303 
128 
44 
11 
4 
3 
0 
1 
1 
495 
40 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50 
117 
51 
10 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
181 
105 
60 
27 
7 
3 
2 
0 
1 
1 
206 
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Table 12-3b. Comparison of Size of Current and Last School District for 
People Who Have Held at Least Two Positions.* 
Current 
District 
Size Is 
Larger 
About the same 
Smaller 
Total 
All 
141 
19 
32 
192 
< 40 
10 
0 
0 
10 
Age 
40-49 
54 
5 
4 
63 
Category 
50-59 
63 
13 
21 
102 
> 59 
9 
1 
7 
17 
a. Sum of age categories does not equal entire sample because some superintendents did 
not report their birth years. 
partment's Basic Educational Data System (BEDS) annual school 
district tapes.4 Panel A of Table 12-4 reports salary data for the 
superintendents in the BEDS sample. The mean salary of superin-
tendents in the sample rose from slightly under $35,000 in 1978-79 
to over $44,000 in 1982-83. Each year the variation in salaries 
across districts was large; for example in 1982-83 superintendents 
in the state earned between $20,000 and $71,000, with the standard 
deviation in salaries equaling almost $10,000. Much of this variation 
is clearly due to the wide variation of school district sizes in the 
sample, however, as we demonstrate below, other factors are also 
important. 
The BEDS data also permit us to track if a superintendent re-
mained in the same school district for two consecutive years, moved 
from one district to another school district in the state during the 
period, or moved from one school district in the state to "out of 
sample" status. In the latter case, the superintendent may have re-
tired or died, may have moved to another superintendency outside 
of New York State (previous studies suggest the vast majority of 
school superintendents serve in only one state during their life-
time; see Knezevich 1971), may have moved to a different educa-
tional position (nonsuperintendent) in another district in the state, 
or may have switched to a noneducational position. Alternatively, 
the school district may simply have failed to report data in the sec-
ond year. 
The data in Panel B of Table 12-4 suggest that the annual turn-
over rates of school superintendents are low, as each year between 
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Table 12-4a. School Superintendents' Salaries in 
to 1982-
Year 
1978-79 
1979-80 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
-83. 
Number of 
Districts 
Reporting 
701 
700 
698 
689 
675 
Mean 
34,964 
36,614 
38,936 
41,665 
44,227 
Standard 
Deviation 
8,325 
8,617 
8,978 
9,479 
9,887 
New York State 
Minimum 
17,500 
17,500 
18,500 
22,785 
20,000 
: 1978-79 
Maximum 
58,500 
61,500 
64,500 
71,000 
71,000 
Table 12-4b. Mobility of School Superintendents in New York State: 
1978-79 to 1982-83. 
Years B D 
1978-79 to 1979-80 
1979-80 to 1980-81 
1980-81 to 1981-82 
1981-82 to 1982-83 
727 
719 
715 
720 
610(84%) 
624 (87) 
582(81) 
634 (88) 
28 (4%) 
29(4) 
42(6) 
28(4) 
89(12%) 
66 (9) 
91 (13) 
58 (8) 
Source: Authors' calculations from data on the New York State Education Depart-
ment's Basic Educational Data System (BEDS) School District Tapes for 1978-79 to 1982-
83. Excluded each year are New York City, districts where the position is vacant, and 
districts that failed to report salary information. 
A = number of superintendents in the sample in the first year. 
B = number (percentage) of superintendents in the first year who were in the same district 
in the second year. 
C = number (percentage) of superintendents in the first year who moved to another dis-
trict in the state in the second year. 
D = number (percentage) of superintendents in the first year who were not employed in 
any district in the sample in the second year. 
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81 and 88 percent of the superintendents continued in their current 
job.5 Each year only 4 to 6 percent of the superintendents moved to 
another district in the state, while 8 to 13 percent of the superin-
tendents dropped out of the sample. 
CROSS-SECTIONAL VARIATION IN 
SUPERINTENDENTS' SALARIES 
A superintendent's salary would be expected to be higher in districts 
that wish to attract and retain outstanding superintendents. These 
would probably be the larger districts (where more students are af-
fected by the superintendent's action), wealthier districts (where the 
demand for education is likely to be greater), districts that contain a 
high proportion of highly educated adults (who are likely to have a 
strong "taste" for education), and districts whose students have 
special educational needs (such as those with a large proportion of 
minority students). On the other hand, characteristics of the super-
intendent should also matter. More experienced and more highly 
educated superintendents are likely to be able to command higher 
salaries. 
Table 12-5 reports attempts to see if these forces do matter. Esti-
mates of annual cross-section salary equations of the form 
log(W;) = a0 +alXi+a2Si + et (12.1) 
where Wj is the annual salary of superintendent i, Xz- is a vector of 
school district characteristics in the employing district, Sj is a vector 
of characteristics of the superintendent, and e is a random error 
term, are reported there. As noted in the table, the school district 
data used in the analyses come from a variety of federal and state 
sources. The characteristics of the superintendents come from two 
volumes of Who's Who in Educational Administration, the directory 
of members of the American Association of School Administrators, 
and the responses to our survey of all school superintendents em-
ployed in New York State in 1984-85.6 
As expected, the characteristics of school districts prove to be im-
portant determinants of superintendents' salaries. Other things held 
constant, in each year larger districts (as measured by the logarithm 
of total enrollment LENR), wealthier districts (as measured by the 
logarithms of property values per enrolled student LVAL), per cap-
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ita personal income in the county (LF1), or census year (1979) 
median family income in the school district (LY2)), and districts 
that place a high value on education (as measured by the percentage 
of the district's adult population with greater than a college degree 
PHED) all are associated with higher superintendents' salaries. 
In contrast, only two of the superintendents' characteristics, his7 
years of tenure in the current district (TEN) and years since receiv-
ing a bachelor's degree (EXPG)—the latter a rough proxy for age or 
total labor market experience—prove to be statistically significant. 
Moreover, the effects of these variables are very small, with the rate 
of return per year of tenure being roughly 0.6 percent and that per 
year since degree being roughly 0.2 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, 
neither the possession of a doctorate degree (DDEG) or a certificate 
of advanced study in administration (CDEG)—the latter an inter-
mediate degree between a master's and a doctorate—nor the total 
number of years of previous experience as a superintendent in other 
school districts (EXPS) systematically are associated with salary. 
Of course, it is well known, and the results of our survey confirm 
(see Table 12-3), that the typical mobility pattern of a superinten-
dent (at least during the early stages of his career) is from smaller to 
larger and/or from poorer to wealthier districts. If this is the case, 
these personal characteristic variables may affect salary indirectly via 
influencing the characteristics of the school district in which the 
superintendent is located, rather than directly influencing his salary 
level, given his district's characteristics. 
To test this hypothesis, the logarithm of property value per 
enrolled student and the logarithm of total enrollment in the super-
intendent's district were both regressed each year on the personal 
characteristics of the superintendent (excluding years of tenure in 
the current district). The results (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and 
Ehrenberg 1986) suggest that having a doctorate degree, having more 
prior experience as a superintendent in other districts, and being 
older were associated with employment in larger school districts, 
while having a doctorate degree was also associated with being em-
ployed in wealthier districts. 
These latter findings have important implications for the following 
analyses of the relationship between superintendents' compensation 
and school districts' performance. Even if within a given school dis-
trict one was to find no relationship between a superintendent's 
compensation and his school district's performance, superintendents 
Table 12-5. Determinants of School Superintendents' Salaries in New York State: Annual Cross-Sections [absolute value 
of t statistics). 
Explanatory0 Variable/ 
Academic Year 
LENR 
LVAL 
LYI 
LY2 
PNW 
PHED 
PCHL 
POOC 
PCOL 
PURB 
DDEG 
CDEG 
EXPS 
TEN 
EXPG 
R2 
n 
1978--79 
Ml (22.5)* 
.045 
.191 
.151 
.178 
.357 
.200 
-.073 
.185 
.014 
-.008 
.000 
.002 
.006 
.002 
.842 
590 
(5.8)* 
(5.2)* 
(3.6)* 
2.6)* 
(2.5)* 
r2.0)* 
1.0) 
r1.8) 
r1.0) 
0.7) 
r0.0) 
1.1) 
5.3)* 
2.1)* 
Logarithm of Annual Salary (SAL) 
1979-80 
.113(20.0)* 
.025 
.228 
.146 
.072 
.449 
.009 
.022 
-.147 
.025 
.006 
-.016 
-.000 
.006 
.003 
.845 
557 
(4.1)* 
(6.5)* 
(3.4)* 
(1.2) 
(3.0)* 
(0.0) 
(0.3) 
(1.3) 
(1.6) 
(0.6) 
(1-4) 
(0.3) 
(5.0)* 
(3.3)* 
1980 -81 
.117(21.2)* 
.028 
.228 
.189 
.032 
.367 
.027 
-.049 
.105 
.000 
.010 
-.014 
.001 
.006 
.002 
.840 
558 
(4.8)* 
(6.3)* 
4.3)* 
(0.4) 
(2.5)* 
(0.3) 
(0.7) 
(1.1) 
0.0) 
(1.0) 
(1.3) 
0.6) 
(5.5)* 
(2.1)* 
1981--82 
.111 (20.7)* 
.019 
.273 
.152 
-.071 
.445 
-.001 
-.036 
.224 
-.019 
.013 
-.032 
-.000 
.004 
.002 
.836 
570 
(3.9)* 
(8.4)* 
(3.6)* 
(i.o) 
(3.1)* 
(0.0) 
(0.5) 
(2.2)* 
(1.2) 
1.4) 
(3.1)* 
(0.1) 
f3.6)* 
2.2)* 
1982-83 
.110(20.0)* 
.011 
.294 
.120 
-.111 
.494 
.074 
-080 
.218 
-.012 
.023 
-.016 
-.000 
.007 
.001 
.828 
574 
(2.3)* 
(9.3)* 
(2.9)* 
(1.7) 
(3.4)* 
(0.8) 
;i.o) 
;2. i)* 
(0.9) 
(2.3)* 
(1.7) 
(0.2) 
(5.7)* 
(0.8) 
4* 
Sources: Authors' computations f rom: 
,rz~^;:v--~^^ 
> 
tr) 
Vi 
n 
•x. 
o 
TEN 
EXPG 
006 (5.3)* 
002 (2.1)* 
.006 (5.0)* 
.003 (3.3)* 
.006 (5.5)* 
.002 (2.1)* 
.004 (3.6)* 
.002 (2.2)* 
.007 (5.7)* 
.001 (0.8) 
R2 
n 
.842 
590 
.845 
557 
.840 
558 
.836 
570 
.828 
574 
Sources: Authors' computations f rom: 
1 Salaries LENR, L VAL-He. York State Education Department, Basic Educational Data System (BEDS) ^ l ^ l ^ ^ 9 1 ^ 7 9 " 
' 1982-83, and New York State Education Department, Financial Data System (ST3) School District Tapes for 1978-79 to 1982-83. 
2. L YJ-U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, unpublished tabulations for 1978 to 1982. 
3 L Y2 to PURB-U.S. Bureau of the Census, 7950 Census of Population, School District Data File for New York State. 
4 DDEG to EX/ 'G-Amer ican Association o f School Administrators, Who's Who in Educational Administration,197'6-77,1980-81 editions, and 
the survey of school superintendents in New York State conducted by the authors in the summer of 1985. 
a. Also included were an intercept term and dummy variables for nonreporting of the superintendents' ' ^ ™ ^ ™ > ™ ™ £ ^ w l ' 
and year of bachelor's degree. Experience and job tenure were avialable for 35 to 65 percent of the sample each year, wh.le year smce degree was 
typically available for 70 to 80 percent of the sample. 
•Coeff ic ient statistically significantly different f rom zero at the .05 level; two-tail test. 
LENR = logarithm of total enrollment in the district in the year. 
LVAL = logarithm of the ful l value of property in the district per enrolled student in the year. 
IY1 = logarithm o f per capita personal income in the country in the year. 
LY2 = logarithm of median family income in the district in 1979. 
PNW = 1979 percentage of the district's population that was nonwhite. 
PHED = 1979 percentage of the district's adult population wi th greater than a college education. 
PCHL = 1979 percentage of the district's households wi th children at home. 
POOC = 1979 percentage owner-occupied housing in the district. 
PCOL = 1979 percentage of the district's adult population wi th some college or a college degree. 
PURB = 1979 percentage o f the district's population residing in urban areas. 
DDEG = 1 = superintendent had a doctoral degree in the year; 0 = no such degree in year. 
CDEG = 1 = superintendent had a certificate of advanced study in the year; 0 = no such degree. 
EXPS = superintendent's total number of years experience in other school districts as a superintendent. 
TEN = superintendent's years of tenure in the current district. 
EXPG = superintendent's years since receiving a bachelor's degree. 
* > 
Z 
H 
Pi 
Z 
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H 
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might still be rewarded for district performance by increased oppor-
tunities for mobility to better paying positions. 
EVALUATING THE "PERFORMANCE" 
OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
We assume that school boards value high academic test scores (high 
educational output) and low school tax rates (more money available 
for other public and private uses), each relative to the comparable 
outcome in "similar" school districts in the state and that they evalu-
ate a superintendent (at least implicitly) by his district's performance 
on these criteria. It is natural to ask how these measures correspond 
to criteria superintendents believe school boards actually use in their 
evaluation. In a survey of school superintendents we asked respon-
dents to list criteria they believed their school boards used in their 
evaluation. Although we gave keeping test scores high and tax rates 
low as two examples of criteria that might be used, the question 
asked was open ended and superintendents were free to respond 
however they wished. In cases where a formal evaluation instrument 
existed, the superintendent was asked to attach it to his response. 
Approximately 80 percent of the respondents (397 of 496) included 
a list of criteria in their responses and about 25 percent of these 
(86) attached formal evaluation instruments. 
A preliminary scanning of the responses suggested that the criteria 
mentioned could be classified into twelve broad categories, and a 
count was made of the number of times each category was men-
tioned. These responses are tabulated in Table 12-6; because most 
superintendents mentioned more than one category, the total count 
across categories far exceeds the number of respondents. 
Most striking (because we gave keeping test scores high and tax 
rates low as examples on the questionnaire of criteria that might 
be used), the most commonly mentioned criteria was community/ 
public relations and school board relations. Fiscal management (the 
category that would include—but which is not limited to—keeping 
tax rates low) came in fourth on the list and was mentioned by 
about two-thirds of the respondents. Academic performance and 
achievement (the category in which keeping test scores high would 
fall) was eighth on the list and was mentioned by less than one-third 
of the respondents. 
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Table 12-6. New York State Public School Superintendents' Perceptions of 
the Criteria School Boards Use in Evaluating Their Performance/1 
Responses Number 
Overall response to the survey 496 
Response to questions on criteria used in evaluation 397 
Mentioned that criteria included: 
Community/public relations 318 
School board relations 294 
Staff and Personnel management 287 
Fiscal management 267 
Curriculum development, educational planning and leadership 202 
Professional and personal development 132 
General management and administration 129 
Academic performance and achievement 125 
Facilities management 50 
Student services and relations 49 
Student discipline 26 
Parent relations 25 
Included a formal evaluation instrument 86 
a. Responses from the approximately 700 school superintendents in New York State 
(excluding New York City) to a survey conducted by the authors in May to July of 1985. 
What are the implications of these findings for the use of the 
objective performance measures that we propose? On the one hand, 
it is hard to envision objective measures that are readily available for 
the other ten criteria; measures of fiscal management and academic 
performance and achievement may be the best one can do. On the 
other hand, it is clear that the specific measures we use are measured 
with considerable error; if these errors are random, the coefficients 
of our performance variables will be biased toward zero in our analy-
ses of mobility and compensation change. Furthermore, given that 
more than twice as many respondents mentioned fiscal management 
as did academic performance, one might expect that, on average, the 
former will prove to be more important than the latter in explaining 
compensation and mobility. 
To give the reader a feel for how the performance measures were 
actually constructed, Table 12-7 presents estimates of tax rate and 
educational outcome equations for 1979-80 (separate equations 
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Table 12-7. 1979-80 Tax Rate and Educational Outcome Equations 
{absolute value of t statistics). 
Explanatory 
Variables/Outcome 
LVAL 
LYJ 
LY2 
PNW 
PHED 
PCHL 
POOC 
PCOL 
PURB 
D 
R2 
n 
log(T) 
-.100(7.0)* 
-.001 (0.0) 
.180(1.8)** 
.691 (4.6)* 
1.009(2.8)* 
.979 (3.7)* 
-.417(2.1)* 
.388 (1.4) 
.271 (7.6)* 
.006(0.1) 
.457 
573 
log (GM) 
-.036(1.2) 
-.243(1.3) 
-.253(1.2) 
1.351 (4.2)* 
-1.331 (1.8)** 
.670 (1.2) 
- .689(1.7)** 
-.685(1.2) 
-.042 (0.6) 
.278 (2.9)* 
.184 
565 
log (AS) 
-.033(1.6) 
-.029 (0.2) 
-.397 (2.8)* 
1.111 (5.2)* 
-1.801 (3.5)* 
.374 (1.0) 
-.653 (2.3)* 
-.634(1.7)** 
-.009 (0.2) 
.205(3.1)* 
.349 
568 
Sources: Authors' calculations are f rom: 
1 . LVAL to PURB-defmed as before, see Table 12-5. 
2. T, D — New York State Education Department, Financial Data System (ST3) School 
District Tape for 1979-80. 
3. GM, AS— New York State Education Department, Pupil Evaluation Program (PEP) Test 
Scores. 
* ( * * ) = coefficient statistically significant f rom zero at .05 (.10) level of significance; two-
tail set. 
T = ful l value property tax rate in the school district in 1979-80. 
GM = percentage of the district's students who scored below the state reference point on 
standardized 6th grade mathematics exam in 1979-80. 
AS = average of the percentages of the district's students who fell below the state refer-
ence point on standardized th i rd- and sixth-grade reading and mathematics exams 
in 1979-80. 
D = 1 = city school district (school board sets tax rate); 0 = other school district 
(voters approve school budget in annual referendum). 
were estimated for each year and the results are very similar across 
years). The tax rate variable is the logarithm of the full-value prop-
erty tax rate in the school district (total school district property tax 
revenue/total value of taxable property in the school district). The 
educational outcome variables are the logarithms of the percentage 
of the district's students who fall below the state reference point on 
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a standardized sixth-grade mathematics examination and the average 
(which we computed) of the percentages who fell below the state ref-
erence point on standardized third- and sixth-grade reading and 
mathematics examinations.8 Students who fall below the state ref-
erence point are deemed to require remedial services, and state aid is 
increased to help fund these services. Because these outcome scores 
measure the proportion who "fail" these tests, we are focusing on 
the bottom tail of the academic achievement distribution.9 
For each of these three outcomes (0), equations were estimated 
of the form 
logOy,- = b0j + b^Zj + Ujj j = 1,2,3 (12.2) 
where 0y,* is outcome ;' in school district i, Zt is a vector of school dis-
trict characteristics in district i expected to influence these outcomes, 
and Ujj is a random error term. In fact, the variables in (12.2) are 
assumed to be identical to those school district variables that enter 
the superintendent salary equation, except that a (1, 0) "city school 
district" dummy variable replaces the continuous size of district vari-
able. The latter is included here because in the large city school 
districts during this period the property tax rate was set by an elected 
school board (subject to constitutional limitations), while in the 
smaller school districts the tax rate was set each year by a voter refer-
endum. One might conjecture, ceteris paribus, that in the latter situa-
tion direct voter control will lead to lower tax rates. 
In the main, the estimates in Table 12-7 conform to one's prior 
expectations and provide reasonable explanations of the tax rates 
and test scores. For example, with respect to tax rates, although 
wealthier (LVAL) districts have lower tax rates, they also raise more 
revenue to finance education because of their higher wealth. Simi-
larly, richer in terms of current income (LY2) districts have higher 
tax rates; districts with higher proportions of nonwhites (PNW), and 
thus special needs, have higher tax rates; districts with higher propor-
tions of adults with more than a college education (PHED), and pre-
sumably greater taste for education, have higher tax rates; and dis-
tricts in which a greater percentage of the households have children 
at home (PCHL), and thus greater interest in spending on education 
relative to keeping taxes down, have higher tax rates.10 
Similarly, with respect to test scores, wealthier districts, districts 
with higher current income and districts with highly educated adults, 
ceteris paribus, all have lower failure rates on the tests, while districts 
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with a higher proportion of nonwhites have higher failure rates. Fail-
ure rates, but not tax rates, also appear to be higher in the "city" 
school districts. It is worth noting that the equation used to predict 
the average test failure rate "fits" much better than the equation 
used to predict the sixth-grade math test failure rate. Although it 
would be preferable to use the former in our analysis, as noted above 
(note 8) only the latter can be used in analyses that exploit the longi-
tudinal nature of the data. 
Given these estimated coefficients, corresponding to b0j and bx: 
in (12.2), one can obtain predicted values of the logarithm of each 
outcome for each school district i from 
log 0yf- = boj + &1;-Zf- j = 1,2,3 (12.3) 
The school district's performance is then defined as the difference 
between the predicted and actual values of the log of each out-
come.11 
Pj{ = logOji - logOy,- j = 1,2,3 (12.4) 
Positive values of P^ indicate positive performance for the district, 
as positive values would occur only when predicted tax rates (or fail-
ure rates on tests) would exceed actual tax rates (or failure rates on 
tests) in the school district. 
It is worth reemphasizing that (12.2), (12.3), and (12.4) are esti-
mated separately each year. Thus, the equations that generate the 
performance measures are allowed to vary across years, as are the 
estimates of tax and test score performance in the district. 
SCHOOL DISTRICT PERFORMANCE 
AND SUPERINTENDENT MOBILITY 
As noted above, each year roughly 5 percent of the superintendents 
in the sample moved to another school district in New York State, 
while roughly 10 percent dropped out. Among the former group, 
approximately 80 percent received salary increases, while 20 percent 
received the same salary after moving or suffered a salary cut. Finally, 
approximately 85 percent of the sample continued in their same 
positions. What determines whether each superintendent moves to 
another district with a higher salary, moves to another district with 
the same or lower salary, leaves the sample, or stays in the same 
school district each year? 
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To econometrically model this joint process of wage change, job 
change, and leave the sample would be extraordinarily complex be-
cause both school boards and superintendents are involved in this 
decision process. What one would ideally like to do is estimate a 
complete structural "matching model" that contains both employer 
(school board) and employee (school superintendent) decision rules. 
Given our limited data, we instead estimated simpler reduced form 
models of the form 
/P(state = &) \ 
l 0 g U s t a t e = 4 ) / = ^ +d*kY + d»S + 
d3kT + dAkE + ek 
k = 1,2, 3 (12.5) 
where Y is a vector of characteristics of the school district (a subset 
of the X in (12.1), 5 is the vector of superintendent characteristics, 
and T and E are the relevant tax rate and educational test score per-
formance measures. The notation P(state = k) denotes the probabil-
ity that an individual is in state k, with the four states being change 
districts with a salary increase, change districts with the same or a 
lower salary, leave the sample, and continue on in the same district, 
respectively. Under suitable assumptions about the distribution of 
the error terms (logistic), the system in (12.5) represents a multi-
nomial logit model and can be estimated by standard maximum like-
lihood methods. Each estimated coefficient in equation k(k = 1,2, 3) 
tells us how the explanatory variable associated with it affects the 
logarithm of the ratio of the probability of the superintendent's 
being in state k relative to the probability of his continuing in the 
same district. 
What relevant tax rate and educational test score performance 
measures should be used in this analysis? On the one hand, one might 
argue that relevant measures would involve changes in performance 
over time. That is, a superintendent's mobility probabilities might 
be influenced by whether his school district's tax rate and test score 
performance measures had improved or worsened over time. On the 
other hand, one might argue that keeping test score and tax rate per-
formance at a constant but high (low) level might lead to higher 
probabilities of moving to a higher- (lower-) paying job. Ultimately, 
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whether a change in performance measure or a level of performance 
measure is correct is an empirical question; we discuss results of ex-
perimenting with various specifications below. 
Suppose, however, that the focus is on the level of performance 
measures; the dating of the performance measures to use must still 
be decided. To clarify this issue, suppose we are looking at potential 
mobility between 1979-80 (the base year) and 1980-81 (the new 
year). The base-year math test (for 1979-80) was given in the spring 
of 1980, and a district may have received its own test results back 
shortly thereafter. However, there is very little chance that it would 
have received data on the test scores in other districts in the state 
prior to the next academic year (the fall of 1980). Such information 
would thus come too late to be used to estimate test score perfor-
mance indexes that could then be used in decisions to retain the 
superintendent for 1980-81 and/or to try to attract a superinten-
dent from another district whose district had high test score perfor-
mance. In fact, the latest (in a temporal sense) test score performance 
measure that could be used in potential mobility studies between 
1979-80 and 1980-81 is the index for 1978-79; we refer to this as 
the lagged year district test performance level index below. 
Using a similar line of reasoning, one can show that potentially 
the base year tax level performance measure is available to be used in 
mobility decisions from the base to the new year. However, if infor-
mation on school district performance is processed by school dis-
tricts only with a lag, the lagged year tax rate performance index 
may again be the relevant one to use. 
When equation (12.5) was estimated using the lagged year perfor-
mance level measures, the lagged tax level performance measure was 
positively associated with the odds of moving to a higher-paying job 
(relative to staying) and negatively associated with the odds of mov-
ing to a lower-paying job (relative to staying).12 Put another way, 
among movers the better lagged tax level performance is, the more 
likely the individual will move to a better job. A school district's 
financial performance does affect its school superintendent's future. 
The math performance variable, however, was always insignificant, 
perhaps because of the reasons discussed in the previous section. 
As suggested from the cross-section results discussed above, hav-
ing a doctorate degree was shown to increase a superintendent's 
chances to move to a better-paying job relative to his chances to not 
move. Older superintendents, as measured by years since receiving a 
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bachelor's degree, were less likely to move to another job and more 
likely to leave the sample, both relative to staying in the same dis-
trict. The former clearly reflects voluntary mobility declining with 
age, and the latter reflects retirement rates increasing with age. 
Superintendents with more previous experience as a superintendent 
in other districts were more likely to move to both higher- or lower-
paying jobs relative to staying in the same district; this may well 
reflect heterogeneity of turnover probabilities. Finally, being em-
ployed in a school district with high median family income reduced 
the probability of moving to a higher-paying job relative to the prob-
ability of staying. As indicated in Table 12-5, higher-income school 
districts pay more, thereby reducing the likely gain to mobility. 
In fact, this latter result suggests that some measure of the super-
intendent's potential gain from mobility should be directly included 
in these equations. We experimented with four such measures: the 
logarithm of base year salary, residual from a base year log salary 
equation that included only superintendents' characteristics, residual 
from a base year log salary equation that included both superinten-
dents' and school district characteristics, and residual from a compre-
hensive base year log salary equation that also included performance 
measures. None of these measures proved to be statistically sig-
nificant (when they were included one at a time), nor did their 
inclusion affect the pattern of signs and significance of the other 
coefficients. 
We also tested for the sensitivity of our mobility results to the 
specification of the performance variables. Four specifications were 
tested: base year level, lagged year level, both base and lagged year 
levels, and change between the base and new year. Results (see 
Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 1986) indicate quite clearly 
that only the lagged level of tax performance matters, with better 
performance leading to an increased (decreased) probability of mo-
bility to a better-paying (not better-paying) position relative to the 
probability of remaining on the same job. 
SCHOOL DISTRICT PERFORMANCE AND 
SUPERINTENDENT SALARY CHANGES 
The previous section focused on the determinants of school super-
intendents' mobility. According to the results discussed, the higher a 
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school district's estimated tax rate performance in the lagged year, 
the greater the probability that the district's superintendent would 
move to a better-paying job and the lower the probability that he 
would move to an equal or lower-paying job, both relative to the 
probability of remaining in the district in the next year. Thus, super-
intendents in school districts with high (low) values of the tax per-
formance measure appear to be rewarded (punished) for their dis-
trict's performance. No such relationship was found, however, be-
tween a district's lagged math test performance measure and its 
superintendent's mobility prospects. 
This section treats the mobility status of superintendents as given 
and examines how salary increases for both superintendents who 
remain in the same district for two consecutive years, and those who 
move to another district in New York State, were related to the 
lagged year tax rate and test score performance measures in the base 
year school district. 
We estimated two salary change equations for superintendents 
who remained in the sample over two consecutive years. In the sim-
plest model, salary change was postulated to be a function only of 
the year we were looking at (because average salary increases varied 
across years) and a variable that indicated whether the superinten-
dent changed jobs during the year. The results suggested that mobil-
ity mattered; on average superintendents who changed jobs received 
salary increases that were 6 percent higher than those who remained 
in the same position. To say that on average "movers" gain is not to 
say, however, that mobility always pays. In fact, as noted above, ap-
proximately one-fifth of the movers each year failed to increase their 
salaries; some of these suffered salary losses as large as 30 percent. 
We next estimated a model in which a superintendent's salary 
change was also postulated to be a function of the lagged tax rate 
and math test score school district performance measures in the 
superintendent's base year school district, as well as the changes in 
the logarithms of county income, school district enrollment, and 
school district full value of property per student, from the base year 
to the new year school district. (For stayers, the latter three variables 
are simply the within district changes in the variables between the 
base and new years.) The coefficients of each of these change vari-
ables and the performance measures were allowed to differ between 
movers and stayers in this model. 
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The results of this analysis suggested that, other things held con-
stant, movers suffered salary losses in the range of 5 to 6 percent 
relative to superintendents who did not change jobs. This occurred 
because among the other things held constant were school district 
income, enrollment, and wealth per student. In fact, the changes in 
each of these variables was positively associated with salary changes 
for movers (but not for stayers). Hence, in order for superintendents 
to have gained from mobility, they must have moved to either higher-
income, larger, or wealthier school districts; this result is fully con-
sistent with the cross-section salary equations presented in Table 
12-5. 
Focusing on the performance variables, the lagged math test per-
formance variable coefficient suggested that superintendents who 
were "stayers" in school districts with above-average math test per-
formance received larger salary increases than other superintendents 
who did not change jobs. In contrast, being employed in a district 
with above-average tax rate performance was positive but insignifi-
cantly associated with the salary increases of stayers. 
What about the effects of performance on the salary changes of 
superintendents who changed jobs? Here the evidence was more 
mixed. Lagged tax performance in the superintendent's base year 
school district was positively associated with earnings gains for 
superintendents who change jobs, but lagged math test performance 
was negatively associated. We have no explanation for this latter find-
ing, which is not consistent with the other results reported here and 
in the previous section.13 
HAVE SCHOOL SUPERINTENDENTS' 
ACTIONS INFLUENCED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT PERFORMANCE? 
Our presumption is that school superintendents can affect our mea-
sures of school district performance and that the provision of appro-
priate financial incentives will encourage them to do so. One may 
wonder, however, whether superintendents' actions per se have had 
any influence on these school district performance measures in the 
past. A simple way to address this issue is to assume that a school 
district's estimated performance in a year depends only on the dis-
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trict and the particular superintendent employed in the district in 
the previous year.14 
Operationally, this is equivalent to specifying a regression model 
in which the dependent variable is an estimated performance measure 
for a school district in year t and the explanatory variables are a set 
of dichotomous variables (one for each of the approximately 1,000 
superintendents in the sample), each of which takes on the value 1 if 
the superintendent that it denotes worked in that school district in 
year t - 1 and 0 otherwise, as well as a set of school district dichoto-
mous variables (one for each of the approximately 700 school dis-
tricts), each which takes on the value 1 if the school district it rep-
resents is that school district and 0 otherwise. If superintendents per 
se matter, at least some of the coefficients of the "superintendent 
variables" should prove to be nonzero. 
To estimate such a model requires one to estimate an equation 
with approximately 1,700 coefficients, no simple computational 
task. However, if one takes the first difference and thereby obtains 
an equation for the change in performance in a school district be-
tween year t and year t - 1, all the school district variables and those 
superintendent variables that represent superintendents who never 
changed jobs during the period drop out of this model. This simpli-
fies the estimation considerably, and when we estimated this latter 
model we found no evidence that knowledge of who the school 
superintendent was in a district in the previous year helped to pre-
dict the school district's tax rate or math test score performance 
measure in a given year (see Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg 
1988 for details). Put another way, superintendents per se did not 
appear to influence our measures of school district performance. 
A more complete analysis would experiment with a variety of 
different lags and use larger sample sizes (more years' data).15 In 
addition, the weakness of our educational performance measures 
should be reemphasized. Data limitations restricted us both here and 
in the previous sections to focusing on the lower tail of the achieve-
ment distribution in mathematics for one elementary grade level. 
More complete measures would focus attention on the upper tail, 
on other subjects, on achievement measures for older students (test 
scores, drop-out rates, high school graduation rates, and college 
attendance rates) and on variables that are less easily measured 
(teaching students to think critically or instilling them with a sense 
of social responsibility). It is clear that our educational performance 
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measures are measured with considerable error; this may well cause 
us to understate both superintendents' effects on them and their 
effects on superintendents' salary changes and mobility. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Are school superintendents in New York State rewarded for their 
school districts' "good performance" by larger salary increases and/ 
or greater opportunities for mobility to higher-paying positions? Al-
though the evidence presented here is somewhat ambiguous, our 
tentative answer is yes. Higher scores on the tax rate performance 
index in the prior (lagged) year were associated with greater (smaller) 
probabilities that a superintendent will move to a better- (poorer-) 
paying job relative to the probability of staying in the same district 
and, for "movers," larger salary increases. Higher scores on the third-
grade mathematics test index in the prior year were associated with 
larger salary increases for stayers. However, contrary to our expecta-
tions, this index was also negatively associated with salary increases 
for movers. It is this latter finding that gives us some pause as we 
draw conclusions. 
Moreover, to say that the market for school superintendents is at 
least implicitly rewarding superintendents for their district's "good 
performance" is not to say that the implicit incentives to perform 
that superintendents face is sufficiently strong. Given the responses 
to our survey's question on the criteria that school boards use in 
their evaluation of superintendents (Table 12-6), our estimates sug-
gest that these incentives are quite modest. 
For example, our estimates suggest that a superintendent who re-
mained in the same district while his district's math test performance 
index remained one standard deviation above the mean performance 
index (which is zero), would receive an annual salary increase that 
was only 0.3 percentage points higher, other things equal, than a 
"mean performer." If the district maintained this level of perfor-
mance over a ten-year period, the superintendent's salary level at the 
end of the period would be only slightly more than three percentage 
points higher than that of the mean performer. Similarly, our results 
suggest that, among superintendents who moved to another position, 
those whose district's tax rate performance index was one standard 
deviation above the mean tax rate performance (which again is zero), 
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would receive a salary increase on moving that was only 1.7 percent-
age points higher, ceteris paribus, than the salary increase that a 
"mean performing mover" would receive. Neither of these magni-
tudes provides a strong incentive for superintendents to perform 
well. 
On the other hand, our estimates suggest that a district's tax rate 
performance substantially influences its superintendent's prospects 
for mobility. Other things equal, a superintendent whose district's 
tax rate performance was one standard deviation above the mean 
would increase the ratio of his probability of moving to a better-
paying job relative to the probability of staying in the same district 
by 40 percent and decrease the ratio of the probability of moving to 
a poorer-paying job relative to the probability of staying by 37 per-
cent. These ratios, however, on average are very small (.038 and .016, 
respectively), so one may question whether even these mobility 
effects are of sufficient magnitude to provide the appropriate incen-
tives for performance. 
Indeed, taken at face value, the results discussed in the previous 
section suggest that superintendents per se do not appear to influ-
ence our measures of school district performance. One may interpret 
this finding in a number of ways. First, it is possible that the incen-
tive effects estimated here are not sufficiently strong to provide ade-
quate incentives for superintendents to try to influence these perfor-
mance measures. Second, it is possible that school superintendents 
actually have little control over these measures (given the effective 
schools literature referred to in the introduction that stresses the 
important roles school administrators play, we doubt that this inter-
pretation is correct). Third, as noted in the previous section, the lim-
ited number of years' data we had available and errors in the mea-
surement of our educational performance measures may have caused 
us to understate both superintendents' effects on school district per-
formance and the latter's effect on superintendents' salary changes 
and mobility. Resolution of which interpretation is correct will 
require additional research that is beyond the scope of our data set, 
although we have discussed throughout the chapter the form that 
some of these analyses might take. 
Assuming that one agrees with the normative propositions that 
school districts should value high educational performance and effec-
tive fiscal management, the appropriate policy recommendations that 
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follow will depend on which interpretation proves correct. Our own 
inclination is to take the results of both our econometric research 
and our survey findings at face value (the first interpretation) and to 
suggest that local school boards build more incentives into school 
superintendents' compensation arrangements to encourage superin-
tendents to improve educational and financial measures of school 
district performance. 
NOTES 
1. Some case studies and statistical analyses of superintendents' turnover and 
mobility have been conducted; see Berger (1983), Knezevich (1971), 
and March and March (1977, 1978). Some comparative data on super-
intendents' salaries has also been published; see American Association of 
School Administrators (1979) and Knezevich. None of these, however, 
attempted to measure "performance" and to see if it matters; indeed, 
March and March (1977) argued that the mobility of superintendents is 
almost a random process. Their approach, however, was criticized by 
Schmittlein and Morrison (1981). 
2. We must caution, however, that the "effective schools" literature has tend-
ed to focus on the role of building administrators (principals) and not on 
the role of school superintendents. 
3. A district can simultaneously have high test scores and low tax rates, rela-
tive to "comparable" districts in the state, if the district's administrators 
efficiently manage both financial and educational (that is, staff) resources 
and effectively motivate school district personnel. 
4. Unfortunately, no data on nonsalary compensation items are available on 
the BEDS tapes; we were limited to analyzing salaries rather than total 
compensation. Excluded from the sample each year were New York City 
(because the size of its school system and its large number of local district 
school boards make it noncomparable to any other district in the state), 
districts in which the superintendent's position was vacant, and districts 
that failed to report salary information. 
5. These turnover data are consistent with what the superintendents them-
selves reported in Table 12-2. 
6. Because less than half of the superintendents in the sample belonged to the 
professional association and the response rate of incumbents to the survey 
was about 70 percent, there was a substantial number of observations with 
missing data on some, or all, of the superintendents' characteristics. We 
also could not obtain school district characteristics data for some of the 
districts. As a result, we excluded observations from the sample if either 
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the school district's characteristics or the superintendent's degree infor-
mation was missing. As Table 12-5 indicates, this reduces our sample sizes 
to between 550 and 600 observations each year. 
7. We use his hereafter because over 97 percent of the approximately 1,010 
superintendents who appear in our sample during the 1978-79 to 1982-83 
period were males. 
8. We isolate the sixth-grade mathematics test because it was the only one of 
the four tests that did not undergo revision during the period and that was 
given in all five years. As a result, while the entire battery of tests can be 
used to construct a performance measure when analyzing a single year's 
cross-section, subsequent sections' longitudinal analyses, which pool data 
across years, are restricted to using the single sixth-grade mathematics test. 
9. These, unfortunately, were the only test score data that the New York 
State Education Department could provide us as they are the only tests 
that all students in the state are required to take. It obviously would have 
been preferable to have test scores for older students and also to focus 
some attention on the upper tail of the achievement distribution. For ex-
ample, data on high school graduation rates or on the fraction of seniors 
going on to higher education would have been desirable. Our focus on the 
lower tail of the elementary school student test distribution imparts addi-
tional error to our educational performance measures, as does our ignoring 
other aspects of educational performance that are not easily measured 
(such as teaching students to write or instilling a sense of social responsi-
bility in them). 
10. A number of people have pointed out that in many communities busines-
ses pay a substantial share of property taxes. Because only residents vote 
on school taxes, it would be desirable to include the share of property 
owned by residents in the total tax base as an additional explanatory vari-
able in the tax rate equation. Discussions with officials in the New York 
State Education Department and Division of Equalization and Assessment 
indicated that (a) residential property data are not readily available at the 
school district level in New York State and (b) such data would not cap-
ture what we are after because some business property may be owned by 
residents and some residential (rental) property may be owned by non-
residents. 
11. A similar "residual approach" to estimating performance was used in Gold-
stein and Ehrenberg (1976) in a different context. 
12. See Ehrenberg, Chaykowski, and Ehrenberg (1986, 1988) for tables of 
statistical results that support the statements made in this and the next 
two sections. 
13. As in the previous section, inclusion of the superintendent's salary in the 
base year as an additional explanatory variable did not alter any of the 
other coefficients. For the subset of school districts for which we had 
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teacher salary data, we also attempted to test if school superintendents' 
salary changes were related to the salary changes of teachers in their school 
districts. This variable, however, never proved statistically significant. 
14. The one-year lag is assumed in the case of the tax rate measure because the 
tax rate in year t is determined by the school board and superintendent in 
year t - 1. Although test scores in year t conceivably could depend on the 
superintendents' actions in year t, a year lag here also seems reasonable. 
Longer panels of data than we have would permit experimentation with a 
variety of lag lengths. 
15. For example, we found similar results (school superintendents per se do 
not appear to influence school district performance) when we assumed 
that performance in period t was a function of the superintendent in 
period t - 2. 
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